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Abstract
Ranking alternatives is a natural way for humans to explain their preferences.
It is being used in many settings, such as school choice, course allocations and
residency matches. In some cases, several “items” are given to each participant.
Without having any information on the underlying cardinal utilities, arguing
about fairness of allocation requires extending the ordinal item ranking to or-
dinal bundle ranking. The most commonly used such extension is stochastic
dominance (SD), where a bundle X is preferred over a bundle Y if its score is
better according to all additive score functions. SD is a very conservative ex-
tension, by which few allocations are necessarily fair while many allocations are
possibly fair. We propose to make a natural assumption on the underlying car-
dinal utilities of the players, namely that the difference between two items at the
top is larger than the difference between two items at the bottom. This assump-
tion implies a preference extension which we call diminishing differences (DD),
where X is preferred over Y if its score is better according to all additive score
functions satisfying the DD assumption. We give a full characterization of allo-
cations that are necessarily-proportional or possibly-proportional according to
this assumption. Based on this characterization, we present a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation if it exists. Using
simulations, we show that with high probability, a necessarily-proportional al-
location does not exist but a necessarily-DD-proportional allocation exists, and
moreover, that allocation is proportional according to the underlying cardinal
utilities. We also consider chore allocation under the analogous condition —
increasing-differences.
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1. Introduction
Algorithms for fair assignment of indivisible items differ in the kind of in-
formation they require from the users.
Some algorithms require the users to rank bundles of items, i.e, report a to-
tal order among the bundles. Examples are the Decreasing Demand procedure
of Herreiner and Puppe [32], the Approximate-CEEI procedure of Budish [23]
and the two-agent Undercut procedure [17, 4]. The computational and commu-
nicational burden might be large, since the number of bundles is exponential in
the number of items.
Other algorithms require the users to evaluate individual items, i.e, supply
a numeric monetary value for each item. Such algorithms are often termed
cardinal. They often assume that the users’ valuations are additive, so that the
value of a bundle can be calculated by summing the values of the individual
items. Examples are the Adjusted Winner procedure of Brams and Taylor [19],
the approximate-maximin-share procedure of Procaccia and Wang [40] and the
Maximum Nash Welfare procedure of Caragiannis et al. [24]. In this setting the
communication is linear in the number of items, but the mental burden may
still be large, since assigning an exact monetary value to individual items is not
easy. This is especially true when items are valued for personal reasons (such
as when dividing inheritance) and do not have a market price.
This paper focuses on a third class of algorithms, which only require the
users to rank individual items, i.e, report a total order among items. Such
algorithms are often termed ordinal.
Ordinal algorithms are ubiquitous in mechanism design. They are often used
in real world applications, such as the National Residency Matching Program
[41] (even when married couples insert their preferences together [3]), school
choice applications [1], and university admittance [30, 31]. One reason for this
is that it is relatively easy for people to state ordinal preferences. Another
reason is related to legacy systems: often the designer can change the allocation
mechanism, but can not change the input procedure, as agents do not want to
learn new ways to insert their input to the system.
Ordinal algorithms are also common in AI and in fair division. Examples are
the AL two-agent procedure of Brams et al. [18], optimal-proportional procedure
of Aziz et al. [6], picking-sequence procedures of Brams and Kaplan [16], Bou-
veret and Lang [15] and the envy-free procedures of Bouveret et al. [13]. Such
algorithms often assume that the agents’ preferences are implicitly represented
by an additive utility function, which is not known to the algorithm. This cre-
ates ambiguity in the agents’ bundle rankings. For example, if an agent ranks
four items as w  x  y  z, then, based on additivity, the algorithm can know
that e.g. {w, x}  {y, z} and {w, y}  {x, z}, but cannot know the relation
between {w, z} and {x, y}. Algorithms cope with this problem in several ways.
1. Necessary-fairness criteria. An allocation is called necessarily-fair
if it is fair for all additive utility profiles consistent with the reported item-
rankings. Here, “fair” may be substituted by any fairness criterion, such as
envy-freeness or proportionality, as well as Pareto-efficiency. Necessary fairness
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is a strong requirement, which is not always satisfiable. For example, the AL
procedure finds a necessarily-envy-free allocation, but only for two agents, and
even then, it might need to discard some of the items.
2. Possible-fairness criteria. An allocation is called possibly-fair if
it is fair for at least one additive utility profile consistent with the reported
item-rankings, Again, “fair” may be substituted by proportional or envy-free
or Pareto-efficient. Possible fairness is a weak criterion; algorithms that only
return possibly-fair allocations might be considered unfair by users whose actual
utility function is different.
3. Scoring rules. A scoring rule is a function that maps the rank of an item
to a numeric score. A common example is the Borda scoring rule [43], where
the least desired item has a score of 1, the next item has a score of 2, and so on.
The score of a bundle is the sum of the scores of its items. It is assumed that all
agents have the same scoring function. I.e, even though agents may rank items
differently, the mapping from the ranking to the numeric utility function is the
same for all agents [15, 33, 12, 26]. This strong assumption weakens the fairness
guarantee. Allocation may appear unfair to agents whose actual scoring rule is
different.
1.1. Contribution
The present paper suggests an alternative between the strong guarantee of
necessary-fairness and the weak guarantee of possible-fairness and scoring-rule-
fairness.
We assume that people care more about their high-valued items than about
their lower-valued items. Specifically, we assume that the utility-difference be-
tween the best item and the second-best item is at least as large as the utility
between the second-best and the third-best, and so on. We call this assumption
Diminishing Differences (DD). The DD assumption is satisfied by the Borda
scoring rule, as well as by many other scoring rules, as well as by lexicographic
preferences.
DD is justified in many settings where the agents are more concerned about
getting a most preferred item than about not getting a least preferred item. For
example, in a matching of doctors to internships, it was reported that doctors
care the most about being assigned to one of their top choices [21, 22].
Based on the DD assumption, we formalize several fairness notions. We
call an allocation necessarily-DD-fair (NDD-fair) if it is fair according to
all additive utility profiles satisfying the DD assumption, and possibly-DD-
fair (PDD-fair) if it is fair according to at least one additive utility profile
satisfying the DD assumption. Again, “fair” may be substituted by envy-free
or proportional or Pareto-efficient. The following implications are obvious for
any fairness criterion:
Necessarily-fair =⇒ NDD-fair =⇒ PDD-fair =⇒ Possibly-fair
In other words, the DD-fairness criteria are intermediate in strength between
necessary-fairness and possible-fairness. A formal definition of these concepts
appears in Section 3.
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The first question of interest is to decide, given an item ranking and two
bundles, whether the NDD or the PDD relation holds between these bundles.
We prove characterizations of the NDD and PDD set relations that provide
linear-time algorithms for answering these questions (Section 4).
Next, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an
NDD-proportional (NDDPR) allocation. Essentially, an NDDPR allocation ex-
ists if-and-only-if it is possible to (a) give all agents the same number of items
and (b) give each agent his best item. The proof is constructive and presents
a simple linear-time algorithm for finding an NDDPR allocation if it exists
(Section 5).
To understand the difference between NDD-fairness and necessary-fairness,
it is interesting to compare the above condition to Condition D of Brams
et al. [18], which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a necessarily-
proportional (NecPR) allocation for two agents. For NecPR, it is required that
for every odd integer k ∈ {1, 3, . . . , 2n− 1}, the agents have a different set of k
best items; in particular, they should have a different worst item (see Example
5.2 in Section 3). For NDDPR, it is only required that the agents have a differ-
ent best item. This means that an algorithm that returns NDDPR allocations
may have larger ‘recall’ than an algorithm that returns only NecPR allocations.
On the other hand, the ‘precision’ of such an algorithm might be lower (i.e, its
output allocations may be considered unfair by some agents).
To assess the magnitude of these effects, we present a simple simulation ex-
periment. We construct partially-correlated utility profiles at random, estimate
the probability that an NDDPR/NecPR allocation exists, and check whether
the NDDPR allocation given by our linear-time algorithm is indeed proportional
according to the underlying cardinal utilities. We find that the increase in recall
is substantial and ranges between 20% and 40%, but the decrease in precision
is not substantial: when there are sufficiently many items, our simple NDDPR
algorithm almost always results in an allocation which is proportional according
to the cardinal utilities. This experiment indicates that there is potential for
further investigation of NDDPR as a normative fairness criterion (Section 6).
While our main interest is in NDD-proportionality, we briefly present several
extensions of our model.
First, instead of proportionality, we study the stronger property of envy-
freeness (EF). Since every EF allocation is PR, every NDDEF allocation is
NDDPR. Therefore, conditions (a) and (b) above are still necessary to NDDEF
existence. When there are n = 2 agents, EF is equivalent to PR, so NDDPR
is equivalent to NDDEF. Therefore, conditions (a) and (b) are also sufficient,
and when they are satisfied, an NDDEF allocation can be found in linear time.
EF and PR diverge when there are three or more agents. When n = 3, we
show that an NDDEF allocation might not exist even if conditions (a) and
(b) hold. We then study the computational problem of deciding whether an
NDDEF allocation exists. Since the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are necessary
for NDDEF, this decision problem is trivial whenever M is not a multiple of n,
and it is also trivial if M = n. Therefore the first interesting case is M = 2n.
We prove that the decision problem is NP-hard already in this case (Section
4
7).
Second, we study Pareto-efficiency (PE). The DD assumption has a sub-
stantial effect on fairness notions: NDD-fair allocations are easier (in terms of
existence) than necessary-fair allocations and PDD-fair allocations are harder
than possibly-fair allocations. Interestingly, the DD assumption does not have
this effect on PE. We show that NDD-PE is equivalent to necessarily-PE and
PDD-PE is equivalent to possibly-PE. So the DD assumption does not lead to
a new efficiency notion (Section 8).
Third, we study the allocation of chores — items with negative utilities. We
assume that people care more about not getting the worst chore than about
getting the best chore; this naturally leads to the condition of increasing differ-
ences (ID). While the basic definitions and lemmas for the DD relations have
exact analogues for the ID relations, our characterization for existence of ND-
DPR allocation of goods has no direct analogue for NIDPR allocation of chores
(Section 9).
Finally, we compare the Diminishing-Differences assumption to another nat-
ural assumption which we call Binary. It is based on the assumption that each
agent only cares about getting as many as possible of his k best items, where
k is an integer that may be different for different agents. We show that, while
the number of utility functions that satisfy this assumption (for a given prefer-
ence relation) is much smaller than the number of DD utility functions, it does
not lead to new fairness concepts: necessary-binary-fairness is equivalent to
necessary-fairness and possible-binary-fairness is equivalent to possible-fairness
(Section 10).
1.2. Related Work
Extending preferences over individual items to sets of items is a natural and
principled way of succinctly encoding preferences [10]. One of the most common
set-extensions is stochastic dominance (SD). It was developed for a different but
related problem — extending preferences over individual outcomes to lotteries
on outcomes. If X,Y are lotteries, then X SD Y iff E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for
every weakly-increasing utility function u [29, 20]. In the context of fair item
allocation, SD leads to the notions of necessary-fairness and possible-fairness
[6]. Other common extensions are downward-lexicographic (DL) and upward-
lexicographic (UL) [25, 13, 38]. A different kind of assumption that is common
in allocating computational resources is that agents have Leontief preferences,
i.e., each agent needs resources in fixed proportions (e.g., [34]).
The diminishing differences extension, which is the focus of this paper, is
quite natural but has not been formalized in prior work. Interestingly, the DD
extension is closely related to second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). If X,Y
are lotteries, then X SSD Y iff E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )] for every utility function
u which is weakly-increasing and weakly-concave [29]. In the context of item
assignment, weak concavity is equivalent to increasing differences — agents
care more about not getting the worst item than about getting the best item.
Increasing differences make sense in fair division of chores [8] and we relate to
it in Section 9.
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Besides fair division, set-extensions have been applied for committee vot-
ing [7] and social choice correspondences (see e.g., [11, 35]). Recently, set ex-
tensions have also been used in philosophic works on ethics. Suppose an ethical
agent has to choose between several actions. He is unsure between two ethical
theories, each of which ranks the choices differently. Thus, each choice is in fact
a lottery. Using the SD set-extension, Aboodi [2] shows that, in some cases, the
agent can still choose an ethically-best action.
In social choice theory, it is common to study restricted domains of prefer-
ence profiles, such as single-peaked, single-crossing or level-r-consensus [37, 39].
Many problems are much easier to solve in such restricted domains than in the
domain of all preferences [27, 28]. The present paper focuses on a restriction to
preferences satisfying the DD assumption, which has not been studied so far.
Many works on fair allocation of indivisible items look for allocations that are
only approximately-fair, for example, envy-free up to at most one item [36, 23].
In contrast, we are interested in allocations that are fair without approximations.
Naturally, such allocations do not always exist, so we are interested in finding
conditions under which they exist.
2. Preliminaries
There is a set N of agents with n = |N |. There is a set M of distinct items
with M = |M|. A bundle is a set of items. A multi-bundle is a multi-set of
items, i.e, it may contain several copies of the same item.2
An allocation X is a function that assigns to each agent i a bundle Xi, such
that M = X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xn and the Xi-s are pairwise-disjoint. Each agent
i has a strict ranking i on items. Each agent may also have a utility function
ui on (multi-)bundles. When we deal with a single agent, we often omit the
subscript i and consider an agent with ranking  and utility-function u.
All utility functions considered in this paper are positive and additive, so
the utility of a (multi-)bundle is the sum of the utilities of the items in it. A
utility function u is consistent with  if for every two items x, y:
u({x}) > u({y}) ⇐⇒ x  y
We denote by U() the set of additive utility functions consistent with .
Given n rankings 1, . . . ,n, we denote by U(1, . . . ,n) the set of vectors
of additive utility functions u1, . . . , un such that ui is consistent with i.
The following definition is well-known:
Definition 2.1. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y :
X %Nec Y ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ U(): u(X) ≥ u(Y ).
X %Pos Y ⇐⇒ ∃u ∈ U(): u(X) ≥ u(Y )
2Multi-bundles are used mainly as a technical tool during the proofs; our primary results
concern simple bundles, that contain (at most) a single copy of each item.
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Given a strict ranking , we assign to each item x ∈ M a level, denoted
Lev(x), such that the level of the best item is M , the level of the second-best
item is M −1, etc (this is also known as the Borda score of the item). we define
the level of a multi-bundle as the sum of the levels of the items in it:
Lev(X) :=
∑
x∈X
Lev(x)
where all copies of the same item have the same level.
3. The Diminishing-Differences Property
We define our new concept of diminishing differences (DD) in three steps:
first, we define the set of DD utility functions (Definition 3.1). Based on this,
we define the necessary-DD and possible-DD relations (Definition 3.3). Based
on this, we define the NDD-fairness and PDD-fairness concepts (Definition 3.6).
Definition 3.1. Let  be a preference relation and u a utility function consis-
tent with . We say that u has the Diminishing Differences (DD) property if,
for every three items with consecutive levels x3  x2  x1 such that Lev(x3) =
Lev(x2) + 1 = Lev(x1) + 2, it holds that u(x3)− u(x2) ≥ u(x2)− u(x1).
We denote by UDD() the set of all DD utility functions consistent with .
Given n rankings 1, . . . ,n, We denote by UDD(1, . . . ,n) the set of all
vectors of DD utility functions, u1, . . . , un, such that ui is consistent with i.
By definition, the Borda utility function consistent with  is a member of
UDD(). Another example of a member in UDD is the lexicographic utility
function Lex(x) := 2Lev(x), by which bundles are ordered by whether they
contain the best item, then by whether they contain the second-best item, etc.
An equivalent definition of UDD is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. u ∈ UDD() iff, for every four items x2, y2, x1, y1 with x2  x1
and y2  y1 and x2 6= y2 and x1 6= y1:
u(x2)− u(y2)
Lev(x2)− Lev(y2) ≥
u(x1)− u(y1)
Lev(x1)− Lev(y1)
The proof is technical and we defer it to Appendix A.
Definition 3.3. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y :
X %NDD Y ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ UDD(): u(X) ≥ u(Y )
X %PDD Y ⇐⇒ ∃u ∈ UDD(): u(X) ≥ u(Y )
Remark 3.4. Comparing Definitions 2.1 and 3.3, it is clear that:
X %Nec Y =⇒ X %NDD Y =⇒ X %PDD Y =⇒ X %Pos Y
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We now define the main fairness concept that we will investigate in this
paper — proportionality.
Definition 3.5. Given utility functions u1, . . . , un, an allocation X is called
proportional if ∀i ∈ N : n · ui(Xi) ≥ ui(M).
Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n, an allocation X is called:
• Necessary-DD-proportional (NDDPR) if it is proportional for all utility
profiles u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
• Possible-DD-proportional (PDDPR) if it is proportional for at least one
utility profile u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
For comparison, recall that an allocation X is called:
• necessarily-proportional (NecPR) if it is proportional for all utility profiles
u1, . . . , un in U(1, . . . ,n).
• possibly-proportional (PosPR) if it is proportional for at least one utility
profile u1, . . . , un in U(1, . . . ,n).
Like in Remark 3.4, it is clear that: necessarily-proportionality implies NDD-
proportionality implies PDD-proportionality implies possibly-proportionality.
We now give equivalent definitions of NDDPR and PDDPR in terms of the
NDD and PDD relations. For every integer k and bundle Xi, define k · Xi as
the multi-bundle in which each item of Xi is copied k times. Proportionality
can be defined by comparing, for each agent i, the bundle Xi copied n times, to
the bundle of all items M.
Lemma 3.6. Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n:
• An allocation X is NDDPR iff ∀i ∈ N : n ·Xi %NDDi M.
• An allocation X is PDDPR iff ∀i ∈ N : n ·Xi %PDDi M.
Proof. For NDDPR, the proof involves just switching the order of two for-all
quantifiers: the original definition is “for all utility profiles - for all agents” and
the new definition is “for all agents - for all utility functions”. Switching for-all
quantifiers yields equivalent statements.
For PDDPR, we have two different quantifiers: the original definition is
“there exists a utility profile for which for every agent...” and the new definition
is “for every agent there exists a utility function...”. The former definition
obviously implies the latter. It remains to prove that the latter implies the
former. Indeed, suppose that for every agent i ∈ N , n ·Xi PDDM. Then for
every i, there exists ui ∈ UDD(i) such that ui(n ·Xi) ≥ ui(M). By additivity,
ui(n·Xi) = n·ui(Xi), so for every i, n·ui(Xi) ≥ ui(M). Therefore the allocation
X is proportional according to the profile (u1, . . . , un) ∈ UDD(1, · · · ,n).
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4. Characterizing NDD and PDD Relations
As a first step in finding DD-fair allocations among many agents, we study
the NDD and PDD relations for a single agent. We are given a preference
relation  on items and two multi-bundles X,Y , and have to decide whether
X %NDD Y and/or X %PDD Y .
We begin by proving a convenient characterization of the NDD relation.
For the characterization, we order the items in each multi-bundle by decreasing
level, so X = {x−1, . . . , x−|X|} where x−1  . . .  x−|X| (the order between
different copies of the same item is arbitrary).3 For each k ≤ |X| we define X−k
as the k best items in X, X−k := {x−1, . . . , x−k}.
Theorem 4.1. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y , X %NDD Y
if-and-only-if both of the following conditions hold:
(i) |X| ≥ |Y | and
(ii) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}: Lev(X−k) ≥ Lev(Y −k).
Theorem 4.1 implies that there is a polynomial time algorithm to check
whether X %NDD Y ; see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Checking the %NDD relation
Input: X,Y ⊂M, and a ranking  of the items in M.
Output: Yes if X %NDD Y ; No otherwise.
if |X| < |Y | then
return No {condition (i) is violated}
end if
Order the items in X and Y by decreasing rank: x−1  · · ·  x−|X| and
y−1  · · ·  y−|Y |.
Initialize TotalLevelDiff:= 0.
for j = 1, . . . , |Y | do
LevelDiff := [Lev(x−j)− Lev(y−j)]
TotalLevelDiff += LevelDiff
if TotalLevelDiff < 0 then
return No {condition (ii) is violated}
end if
end for
return Yes
Remark 4.2. Contrast this characterization with the following characterization
of Nec from Aziz et al. [6]. X %Nec Y iff:
(i) |X| ≥ |Y | and
3We use negative indices so that the order of indices is the same as the order of levels.
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(ii) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}, the number of items in X that are better than
xk is at least as much as the number of items in Y better than xk.
Before proving Theorem 4.1, we give some examples.
Example 4.3. Suppose the set of items is M = {8, . . . , 1} and we are given
a preference-relation 8  · · ·  1, so that each item is represented by its level.
Consider the following two bundles:
X = {8, 4, 2} Y = {7, 6}
Note that |X| > |Y |, X is lexicographically-better than Y , and even the Borda
score of X is higher. However, the level of X2 (the two best items in X) is only
12 while the level of Y 2 is 13. Hence, by Theorem 4.1, X 6NDD Y . Indeed, X is
not better than Y according to the DD utility function usquare(x) := Lev(x)
2,
since usquare(X) = 84 < 85 = usquare(Y ).
Example 4.4. Consider the following two bundles:
X ′ = {8, 5} Y = {7, 6}
Now the conditions of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied: |X| ≥ |Y | and Lev(X1) ≥
Lev(Y 1) and Lev(X2) ≥ Lev(Y 2). Hence the theorem implies that X ′ NDD
Y . In contrast, condition (ii) im Remark 4.2 is not satisfied since the in X there
is only one item better than 5 while in Y there are two such items. Therefore
X 6Nec Y . Indeed, X ′ is not better than Y by the utility function usqrt(x) :=√
Lev(x), since usqrt(X) ≈ 5.06 < 5.09 ≈ usqrt(Y ).
Proof of Theorem 4.1, only-if part. We assume that either (i) |Y | > |X|, or (ii)
Lev(Y −k) > Lev(X−k) for some k, and prove that X 6%NDD Y , i.e, there is a
utility function u ∈ UDD() such that u(X) < u(Y ).
(i) If |Y | > |X|, then take:
u(x) = M |Y |+ Lev(x).
It has diminishing-differences since the difference in utilities between items
with adjacent ranks is 1.
The term M |Y | is so large that the utility of a bundle is dominated by its
cardinality. Formally, for every item x, M |Y | < u(x) ≤M + M |Y |, so:
u(X) ≤ |X| · (M + M |Y |)
< M |Y |+ |X| ·M |Y | since |X| < |Y |
= (|X|+ 1) ·M |Y |
≤ |Y | ·M |Y | since |X| < |Y |
< u(Y )
Hence X 6%NDD Y .
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(ii) If for some k, Lev(Y −k) > Lev(X−k), then let k be the smallest integer
that satisfies this condition; hence y−k  x−k. Let C := Lev(x−k) − 1
and define u as:
u(x) = Lev(x) for x ≺ x−k
u(x) = [Lev(x)− C] ·M |X| for x  x−k
so the utilities of the items worse than x−k are 1, 2, . . . , C, and the utilities
of x−k and the items better than it are M |X|, 2M |X|, 3M |X|, . . ..
u has diminishing-differences, since the difference in utilities between ad-
jacent items ranked weakly above x−k is M |X|, the difference between
x−k and the next-worse item is less than M |X| and more than 1, and the
difference between adjacent items ranked below x−k is 1.
The term M |X| is so large that the utility of a bundle is dominated by
the level of its items that are weakly better than x−k. Formally:
u(X) = u({x−1, . . . , x−k}) + u({x−(k+1), . . . , x−|X|})
= M |X| · [Lev({x−1, . . . , x−k})− k · C] + Lev({x−(k+1), . . . , x−|X|})
The assumption Lev(Y −k) > Lev(X−k) implies that Lev(X−k) ≤ Lev(Y −k)−
1. Hence the leftmost term is at most M |X| · [Lev({y−1, . . . , y−k})− 1−
k ·C]. Since the level of an item is at most M , the rightmost term is less
than M |X|. Hence:
u(X) < M |X| · [Lev({y−1, . . . , y−k})− 1− k · C] + M |X|
= M |X| · [Lev({y−1, . . . , y−k})− k · C]
≤ u(Y −k) ≤ u(Y )
Hence X 6%NDD Y .
Proof of Theorem 4.1, if part. We assume that |X| ≥ |Y | and that ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |} :
Lev(X−k) ≥ Lev(Y −k). We consider an arbitrary utility function u ∈ UDD()
and prove that ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |} : u(X−k) ≥ u(Y −k). This will imply that
u(X) ≥ u(Y ), so that X %NDD Y . We assume that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}:
xj 6= yj . This does not lose generality, since if for some j we have xj = yj ,
we can just remove this item from both X and Y ; this changes neither the
assumptions nor the conclusion.
In the proof we use the following notation.
• lk := Lev(x−k)− Lev(y−k).
• Lk := Lev(X−k)− Lev(Y −k) = ∑kj=1 lk.
• uk := u(x−k)− u(y−k).
• rk := uk/lk.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the graphs Lk and Uk in the proof of Theorem 4.1, if part.
• Uk := u(X−k)− u(Y −k) = ∑kj=1 uk = ∑kj=1 rklk.
In this notation, the assumption is ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |} : Lk ≥ 0, and we have to
prove that ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |} : Uk ≥ 0.
Suppose we walk on the graph of Lk (see Figure 1). When we move from
Lj−1 to Lj , we make lj steps (upwards if lj > 0 or downwards if lj < 0).
By assumption the graph is always above zero, so to every step downwards,
corresponds a previous step upwards.
Suppose we walk simultaneously on the graph of Uk. When we move from
U j−1 to U j , we make a step of size uj = rj lj ; equivalently, we make lj steps of
size rj (upwards if lj > 0 or downwards if lj < 0). So to every step of size 1 on
the graph of Lk corresponds a step of size rj on the graph of U
k (see Figure 1).
The items in X and Y are ordered by decreasing rank. Hence, by Lemma 3.2,
the sequence rk is weakly decreasing with k. Therefore, to every step downwards
of size rj on the graph of U
k, corresponds a previous step upwards, and its size
is at least rj .
Therefore, the graph of Uk, too, always remains above 0.
Our next theorem gives an analogous characterization of the PDD relation.
Theorem 4.5. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y , Y %PDD X
if-and-only-if at least one of the following conditions hold:
(i) |Y | > |X|, or
(ii) for some k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}: Lev(Y −k) > Lev(X−k), or
(iii) Lev(Y ) ≥ Lev(X).
Proof of if part. If either (i) or (ii) holds, then we can take a utility function
u ∈ UDD() exactly as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 [only-if part]. If (iii) holds,
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we can just take u(x) = Lev(x). Since u ∈ UDD() and u(Y ) ≥ u(X), this
implies Y %PDD X.
Proof of only-if part. We assume that none of the three conditions holds, and
prove that Y 6%PDD X. So we have:
(̂i) |X| ≥ |Y |, and
(̂ii) ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |} : Lev(X−k) ≥ Lev(Y −k), and
(̂iii) Lev(X) > Lev(Y ).
From here the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 [if part]: by the
first two conditions, the graph of Lk is always weakly above zero, so to every
step downwards corresponds a previous step upwards. Moreover, (̂iii) implies
that Lev(X) − Lev(Y ) > 0, so the graph of Lk ends strictly above zero, so
there exists a step upwards with no corresponding step downwards. Therefore
the graph of Uk, too, ends strictly above 0. Therefore, u(X) > u(Y ).
The same is true for every u ∈ UDD(). Hence Y 6%PDD X.
Theorem 4.5 implies that there is a polynomial time algorithm to check
whether X %PDD Y ; the algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 and we omit it.
Using Theorem 4.5, we illustrate the difference between PDD-fairness and
possible-fairness.
Example 4.6 (PDD-fairness vs. possible-fairness). Alice and Bob have the
same preferences, for some m ≥ 3:
2m  2m− 1  ...  4  3  2  1
Both Alice and Bob get m items: Alice gets 2m, 2m− 1, ...m + 3,m + 2, 1 and
Bob gets m + 1,m, ...3, 2. Intuitively this allocation seems very unfair, since
Alice gets all the m − 1 best items. However, it is possibly-proportional, since
Bob’s utility function might assign the a value near 0 to item 1 and a value near
1 to all other items.
In better accordance with our intuition, the above allocation is not PDD-
proportional: by Theorem 4.5, Bob’s bundle is not PDD-better than Alice’s
bundle, since it does not satisfy any of the conditions (i) to (iii).
Based on the two constructive theorems proved in this section, we have:
Corollary 4.7. It can be decided in polynomial time whether a given allocation
is NDDPR or PDDPR.
5. Existence of NDD-Proportional Allocations
In this section, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of
NDDPR allocations.
Theorem 5.1. An NDDPR allocation exists if-and-only-if:
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(a) The number of items is M = m ·n, where m is an integer and n is the
number of agents, and -
(b) Each agent has a different best item.
In case it exists, it can be found in time O(M).
Proof of only-if part. Let X1, . . . , Xn be an NDDPR allocation. Then for every
agent i, n ·Xi %NDDi M. By the two conditions of Theorem 4.1:
(a) For all i: |n ·Xi| ≥ |M| =⇒ n · |Xi| ≥M. But this must be an equality
since the total number of items in all n bundles is exactly M . Therefore, the
total number of items is n · |Xi| which is an integer multiple of n.
(b) For all i, the level of the best item in n ·Xi must be weakly larger than
the level of the best item in M. So for every i, Xi must contain agent i’s best
item. So the best items of all agents must be different.
Proof of if part. Suppose the two conditions are satisfied. We prove that the
balanced round-robin algorithm (Algorithm 2) produces an NDDPR allocation.4
Algorithm 2 Balanced round-robin allocation of items
while there are remaining items do
for i = 1, . . . , n do
Give agent i his best remaining item.
end for
for i = n, . . . , 1 do
Give agent i his best remaining item.
end for
end while
Let Xi be the bundle allocated to agent i by balanced-round-robin. We prove
that n ·Xi %NDDi M by the two conditions of Theorem 4.1.
Condition (i) is satisfied with equality, since by (a) each agent gets exactly
m items, so |n ·Xi| = nm = M = |M|.
Condition (ii) says that, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the total level of the k
best items in the multi-bundle n ·Xi is at least as large as the total level of the
k best items inM. It is convenient to verify this condition following Algorithm
1: we have to prove that, when going over the items in both bundles from best
to worst, the total level-difference between them (the variable TotalLevelDiff in
the algorithm) remains at least 0.
We first prove that this is true after the first round. By condition (b), in
the first round each agent receives his best item, so the level of the best n items
4For simplicity we assume the agents truthfully report their rankings to the algorithm.
Even if one or more agents are not truthful, the allocation will still be NDDPR according to
the revealed rankings, as long as the revealed rankings satisfy condition (b).
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in n · Xi is M . The following table shows the levels and their differences for
k ∈ {1, . . . , n} (recall that all items in M are distinct):
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 . . . k = n
n ·Xi M M M . . . M
M M M − 1 M − 2 . . . M − n + 1
LevelDiff 0 1 2 . . . n− 1
TotalLevelDiff 0 1 3 . . . n(n− 1)/2
We now prove that, after each round r ≥ 1, the accumulated level-difference
TotalLevelDiff is at least n(n− 1)/2 when r is odd, and at least n(i− 1) when
r is even. In particular, it is always at least 0.
The proof is by induction on r. We have just proved the base r = 1.
Suppose now that r is even and r > 1. When agent i gets an item, the
number of items already taken is rn − i. Therefore, agent i’s best remaining
item has a level of at least M − (rn − i). Therefore, the level-differences for
k ∈ {(r−1)n+1, . . . , rn} are as in the following table (where the last row uses
the accumulated level-difference of n(n− 1)/2 from the induction assumption):
n ·Xi ≥M − rn+ i ≥M − rn+ i . . . ≥M − rn+ i
M M − rn+ n M − rn+ n− 1 . . . M − rn+ 1
LevelDiff ≥ i− n ≥ i− n + 1 . . . ≥ i− 1
TotalLevelDiff ≥ n(n−1)
2
+ i− n ≥ n(n−1)
2
+ 2i− 2n + 1 . . . ≥ n(i− 1)
Since i ≥ 1, TotalLevelDiff is always at least 0. A simple calculation shows that,
after round r ends, it is at least n(i− 1) as claimed.
Suppose now that r is odd and r > 1. When agent i gets an item, the
number of items already taken is rn − (n − i + 1). Therefore, agent i’s best
remaining item has a level of at least M − rn + (n − i + 1). Therefore, the
level-differences for k ∈ {(r − 1)n + 1, . . . , rn} are as in the following table:
n ·Xi ≥M − rn + n− i + 1 ≥M − rn + n− i + 1 . . . ≥M − rn + n− i + 1
M M − rn + n M − rn + n− 1 . . . M − rn + 1
LevelDiff ≥ 1− i ≥ 2− i . . . ≥ n− i
TotalLevelDiff ≥ n(i− 1) + 1− i ≥ n(i− 1) + 3− 2i . . . ≥ n(n− 1)/2
Since i ≤ n, TotalLevelDiff is always at least 0. A simple calculation shows
that, after round r ends, it is at least n(n− 1)/2 as claimed.
Using Theorem 5.1, we illustrate the difference between NDD-fairness and
necessary-fairness.
Example 5.2 (NDD-fairness vs. necessary-fairness). Suppose the set of items
is M = {2m, . . . , 1}, for some m ≥ 2. Alice and Bob have almost opposite
preferences:
Alice: 2m  2m− 1  ...  4  3  2  1
Bob: 2  3  4  ...  2m− 1  2m  1
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Intuitively we would expect that opposite preferences make it easy to attain a
fair division. However, in this case no necessarily-proportional allocation exists:
By Remark 4.2, in a necessarily-fair allocation both agents must receive the
same number of items (m). But Alice and Bob have the same worst item (1),
so one of them must get it. Suppose it is Alice. So Alice has only m− 1 items
better than 1, while Bob has m items better than 1. Hence, the allocation is
not necessarily-proportional for Alice (her utility function might assign a value
near 0 to this item and a value near 1 to all other items).
In contrast, our Theorem 5.1 shows that an NDD-proportional allocation
exists. Intuitively, since it is possible to give each agent his/her best items, they
are willing to compromise on the less important items.
6. NDD-Proportionality in Simulations
Figure 2: NDD-proportionality in Simulations
We compared the various fairness criteria using a simulation experiment with
2 agents. First, we checked to what extent the probability that an NDDPR
allocations exists is higher than the probability that a NecPR allocation exists.
These probabilities naturally depend on the correlation between the agents’
rankings. When the rankings are completely correlated, both NDDPR and
NecPR allocations do not exist; when the rankings are completely independent,
both NDDPR and NecPR allocations exist with high probability; the interesting
zone is when the rankings are partially correlated. To simulate such rankings,
we determined for each item a “market value” drawn uniformly at random
from [1, 2]. We determined the value of each item to each agent as the item’s
market value plus noise drawn uniformly at random from [−A,A], where A is
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a parameter. Based on the cardinal values we determined the agent’s ordinal
ranking. Then, we checked whether there exists an NecPR/NDDPR allocation.
We did this experiment 1000 times for different values of A ∈ {0.1, . . . , 1} and for
different numbers of items — 2m items for m ∈ {2, . . . , 8}. Typical results are
plotted in Figure 2; the probability of existence of NDDPR allocations (balls)
is clearly higher than that of NecPR allocations (triangles):
Since we had randomly-generated cardinal values, we used them for a sec-
ondary purpose — we checked whether, when an NDDPR allocation exists, the
one found by the simple algorithm of Section 5 is proportional according to
these values (dashed lines). Note that, since the randomization we used is com-
pletely uniform and does not use the DD assumption, the probability that DD
holds for both agents is very low — 1/((2m− 1)!)2. Nevertheless, our NDDPR
allocation (when it exists) is almost always proportional when the number of
items or the noise size are sufficiently large, which further shows the robustness
of our algorithm.
We also checked the probability of existence of PDDPR and PosPR alloca-
tions, and it was nearly 1.0. Thus, apparently the NecPR requirement is too
strong and the PDDPR and PosPR requirements are too weak, while the ND-
DPR requirement hits a sweet spot between ‘recall’ and ‘precision’: it allows us
to solve many instances (= high ‘recall’) and most solutions are satisfactory (=
high ‘precision’).5
7. Envy-freeness
The following is an analogue of the definition of proportionality-related fair-
ness concepts (Definition 3.5):
Definition 7.1 (Envy-freeness). Given utility functions u1, . . . , un, an alloca-
tion X is called envy-free (EF) if ∀i, j ∈ N : ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Xj).
Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n, an allocation X is called:
• Necessary-DD-envy-free (NDDEF) if it is envy-free for all utility profiles
u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
• Possible-DD-envy-free (PDDEF) if it is envy-free for at least one utility
profile u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
The following is an equivalent definition of NDDEF; it is a partial analogue
of Lemma 3.6:
Lemma 7.2. Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n:
• An allocation X is NDDEF iff ∀i, j ∈ N : Xi %NDDi Xj.
5The experiment code is available at GitHub:
https://github.com/erelsgl/PrefLib-Tools/tree/master/experiments/diminishing-differences
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Proof. The proof involves switching the order of three “for all” quantifiers: the
original definition is “for all utility profiles - for every agent i - for every agent
j” and the new definition is “for every agent i - for every agent j - for all utility
functions”. Switching for-all quantifiers yields equivalent statements.
We do not have an equivalent definition of PDDEF in terms if the %PDDi re-
lations.6 Below we focus on the NDDEF criterion, since based on our simulation
results, we believe the PDDEF criterion (like most possible-fairness criteria) is
too weak to be useful.
Since every NDDEF allocation is NDDPR, the two conditions of Theorem
5.1 are necessary for the existence of NDDEF allocations for any number of
agents. In the special case of n = 2 agents, NDDPR is equivalent to NDDEF so
these conditions are also sufficient. But for n = 3 they are no longer sufficient.
Example 7.3. There are six items {1, . . . , 6}. The preferences of the three
agents Alice Bob and Carl are:
Alice: 6  5  3  4  2  1
Bob: 5  4  3  6  2  1
Carl: 4  6  3  5  2  1
The conditions of Theorem 5.1 are clearly satisfied: the number of items is a
multiple of 3 and the best items are all different. However, no NDDEF allocation
exists. Proof: The preferences are the same up to a cyclic permutation between 6
5 and 4, so the agents are symmetric and it is without loss of generality to assume
that Alice receives item 1. Therefore, to ensure proportionality, Alice’s bundle
must be {6, 1} and her Borda score is 7. To ensure that Alice is not envious,
Bob must get {5, 2} and Carl must get {3, 4}. This allocation is NDDPR but
it is not NDDEF, since Bob envies Carl according to the Borda score.
Since the NDDPR characterization does not work for NDDEF allocations
even for three agents, it is an open problem whether the existence of NDDEF
allocations can be decided efficiently when there are 3 or more agents.
When the number of agents is not bounded, we have a hardness result:
Theorem 7.4. When there are n ≥ 3 agents and at least 2n items, checking
the existence of NDDEF allocations is NP-complete (as a function of n).
6The original definition of PDDEF is: “there exists a utility profile for which, for every i
and j, i does not envy j.”. This implies that, for every i and j, there exists a utility function
ui by which i does not envy j, i.e., Xi %PDDi Xj . However, the implication is not true in
the other direction when there are three or more agents. For example, if X1 %PDD1 X2 and
X1 %PDD1 X3, then it is possible that agent 1 does not envy agent 2 by some DD function
u1,2, and does not envy agent 3 by some other DD function u1,3, but there is no single DD
function by which agent 1 envies neither agent 2 nor agent 3.
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Proof. By Lemma 7.2, to check whether an allocation is NDDEF, we have to
do at most n2 checks of the %NDD relation. Each such check can be done in
polynomial time by Theorem 4.1 and Algorithm 1. Hence the problem is in NP.
The proof of NP-hardness is similar to the proof of Bouveret et al. [13] for
the NP-hardness of checking existence of necessarily-envy-free allocations. The
proof requires carefully checking that the reduction argument works for NDDEF
as well. The details are presented in Appendix A.
When the number of agents is constant (at least 3) and the number of items
is variable, the runtime complexity of checking NDDEF existence is an open
question: is it polynomial like NDDPR, or NP-hard like Necessary-EF [9]?
8. Pareto-efficiency
An allocation is called Pareto-efficient if every other allocation is either not
better for any agent, or worse for at least one agent:
Definition 8.1 (Pareto-efficiency). Given utility functions u1, . . . , un, an allo-
cation X is called Pareto-efficient (PE) if for every other allocation Y, either
∀i ∈ N : ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Yi), or ∃i ∈ N : ui(Xi) > ui(Yi). Given item rankings
1, . . . ,n, an allocation X is called:
• Necessary-DD-Pareto-efficient (NDDPE) if it is Pareto-efficient for all
utility profiles u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
• Possible-DD-Pareto-efficient (PDDPE) if it is Pareto-efficient for at least
one utility profile u1, . . . , un in UDD(1, . . . ,n).
For comparison, recall that an allocation X is called:
• Necessary-Pareto-efficient (NecPE) if it is Pareto-efficient for all utility
profiles u1, . . . , un in U(1, . . . ,n).
• Possible-Pareto-efficient (PosPE) if it is Pareto-efficient for at least one
utility profile u1, . . . , un in U(1, . . . ,n).
It is clear from the definition that necessarily-PE implies NDD-PE implies
PDD-PE implies possibly-PE. With the analogous fairness concepts, these im-
plications are strict, i.e., some possibly-fair allocations are not PDD-fair, and
some NDD-fair allocations are not necessarily-fair. Interestingly, with Pareto-
efficiency the situation is different:
Theorem 8.2. An allocation is NecPE if-and-only-if it is NDDPE.
Proof. The implication NecPE =⇒ NDDPE is obvious by the definition. We
now consider an allocation X that is not NecPE and prove X is not NDDPE.
By Aziz et al. [5] Theorem 9, if X is not NecPE then there are two options:
(i) X is not possibly-PE. Then, it is certainly not NDD-PE.
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(ii) X admits a Pareto-improving one-for-two-swap. I.e, there are two agents
Alice and Bob, such that XA contains an item x, XB contains two items y, z,
and Bob strictly prefers the one item over the two, i.e.: x B y and x B z.
Then X is not NDD-PE, since it is not PE for the following utility profile:
• uA(x) = M2 + LevA(x)
• uB(x) = 2LevB(x)
Note that both utility functions have DD. Alice’s utility is dominated by the
number of items she has, so she always prefers two items to one. Bob’s utility is
lexicographic, so he always prefers one good item to any number of worse items.
Hence, by switching {x} and {y, z} we get a new allocation that is strictly better
for both Alice and Bob, and does not affect any other agent.
Similarly:
Theorem 8.3. An allocation is PosPE if-and-only-if it is PDDPE.
Proof. The implication PDDPE =⇒ PosPE is obvious by definition. We now
consider an allocation X that is not PDDPE and prove X is not PosPE.
Consider the lexicographic utility profile, by which for each i ∈ N , ui(x) =
2Levi(x). Since these utilities have DD, X is not PE according to this profile. So
there exists an allocation Y by which for some agent Alice: uA(YA) > uA(XA),
and for all agents B: uB(YB) ≥ uB(XB).
Since Alice prefers YA to XA by a lexicographic utility function, there exists
some integer k ≥ 1 such that XA and YA contain the same k−1 best items, but
the k-th best item in YA (denoted by ya) is better for Alice than the k-th best
element in XA.
In allocation X, item ya belonged to some other agent, say Bob. But Bob
must be weakly better-off in Y than in X, so YB must contain a better item
that was not in XB ; let’s call this item yb. In allocation X, item yb belonged to
some other agent, say Carl. From similar considerations, Carl must have in Y
an item yc that he prefers to yb. Continuing this way, we end with a cycle of
agents, each of whom gave an item to the previous agent and received a better
item from the next agent.
Now consider the allocation Z which is identical to X except that the single-
item exchanges in the cycle take place (so ya is given to Alice, yb is given to
Bob and so on). Then Z is better than X for all agents in the cycle, and this is
true for any additive utility function. Hence, X is not possibly-PE.
It is interesting that whereas DD leads to new fairness notions, it does not
lead to a new efficiency notion.
9. Chores and Increasing Differences
In this section, we assume that we have to divide indivisible chores, defined
as items with negative utilities. Therefore, all the utility functions we consider
in this section assign strictly negative values to all items.
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With chores, the Diminishing Differences condition means that the difference
between the easiest to the second-easiest chore is larger than the difference be-
tween the second-hardest to the hardest chore. But usually, with chores, people
care more about not getting the hardest chores than about getting the easiest
chores. Therefore, we introduce the condition of increasing differences (ID).
In many aspects, the ID condition for chores is analogous to the DD condition
for goods (subsection 9.1). However, finding necessarily-ID-fair allocation for
chores is more difficult than necessarily-DD-fair allocation for goods (subsec-
tions 9.2,9.3,9.4).
9.1. Increasing differences — basic definitions
The following definition is analogous to Definition 3.1:
Definition 9.1. Let  be a preference relation and u a utility function consis-
tent with . We say that u has the Increasing Differences (ID) property if, for
every three items with consecutive levels x3  x2  x1 such that Lev(x3) =
Lev(x2) + 1 = Lev(x1) + 2, it holds that u(x3)− u(x2) ≤ u(x2)− u(x1).
We denote by UID() the set of all ID utility functions consistent with .
Given n rankings 1, . . . ,n, We denote by UID(1, . . . ,n) the set of all
vectors of ID utility functions, u1, . . . , un, such that ui is consistent with i.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between DD utilities and ID utilities.
Given a strict ranking , define its reverse ranking rev as:
∀x, y ∈M : y rev x ⇐⇒ x  y
Given a utility function u, define its reverse function urev as:
∀x ∈M : urev(x) := −u(x)
Then:
Lemma 9.2. For every ranking  and utility function u:
urev ∈ UID(rev) ⇐⇒ u ∈ UDD().
Proof. Clearly urev is consistent with rev, iff u is consistent with . Now:
urev ∈ UID(rev) ⇐⇒
for every three consecutive items x3 rev x2 rev x1:
urev(x3)− urev(x2) ≤ urev(x2)− urev(x1) ⇐⇒
for every three consecutive items x1  x2  x3:
− u(x3)−−u(x2) ≤ −u(x2)−−u(x1) ⇐⇒
for every three consecutive items x1  x2  x3:
u(x1)− u(x2) ≥ u(x2)− u(x3) ⇐⇒
u ∈ UDD().
Some examples of members in UID() are:
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• The negative-Borda utility function: u−Borda(x) := Lev(x) −M − 1, by
which the chore utilities, from easiest to hardest, are −1, . . . ,−M .
• The negative-lexicographic utility function: u−Lex(x) := −2M−Lev(x). By
this function, the bundles are first ranked by whether they contain the
worst chore, then by whether they contain the next-worst chore, etc.
An equivalent definition of UID is given by the following lemma. It is analogous
to Lemma 3.2 and proved in a similar way, so we omit the proof:
Lemma 9.3. u ∈ UID() iff, for every four items x2, y2, x1, y1 with x2  x1
and y2  y1 and x2 6= y2 and x1 6= y1:
u(x2)− u(y2)
Lev(x2)− Lev(y2) ≤
u(x1)− u(y1)
Lev(x1)− Lev(y1)
Analogously to Definition 3.3, we have the following definitions.
Definition 9.4. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y :
X %NID Y ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈ UID(): u(X) ≥ u(Y )
X %PID Y ⇐⇒ ∃u ∈ UID(): u(X) ≥ u(Y )
The NID/PID relations are closely related to the NDD/PDD relations:
Lemma 9.5. Let  be a ranking and rev its inverse ranking. Then, for every
two multi-bundles X,Y :
X %NID Y ⇐⇒ Y %NDDrev X
X %PID Y ⇐⇒ Y %PDDrev X
Proof. By Lemma 9.2:
X %NID Y ⇐⇒
∀u ∈ UID(): u(X) ≥ u(Y ) ⇐⇒
∀urev ∈ UDD(rev): urev(X) ≤ urev(Y ) ⇐⇒
Y %NDDrev X.
Similarly:
X %PID Y ⇐⇒
∃u ∈ UID(): u(X) ≥ u(Y ) ⇐⇒
∃urev ∈ UDD(rev): urev(X) ≤ urev(Y ) ⇐⇒
Y %PDDrev X.
Thus, to check whether X %NID Y / X %PID Y with regards to some
ranking , we can simply use Algorithm 1 with the inverse ranking rev.
We now want to prove an analogue of Theorem 4.1 for chores. For this, we
order the chores in each multi-bundle by increasing level, so X = {x1, . . . , x|X|}
where x1 i . . . i x|X| (the order between different copies of the same chore
is arbitrary). For each k ≤ |X| we define Xk as the k worst chores in X,
Xk := {x1, . . . , xk}.
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Theorem 9.6. Given a ranking  and two (multi-)bundles X,Y of chores,
X %NID Y if-and-only-if both of the following conditions hold:
(i) |X| ≤ |Y |;
(ii) For each k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}: Lev(Xk) ≥ Lev(Y k).
Note that condition (i) is the opposite of condition (i) in Theorem 4.1: X
has to have weakly less chores than Y . However, condition (ii) is identical to
condition (ii) in Theorem 4.1.
Proof. By Lemma 9.5, X %NID Y iff Y %NDDrev X. We define the inverse-level
of an item/bundle as its level under the inverse-ranking %rev. So the inverse-
level of the hardest chore is M and of the easiest chore is 1. By Theorem 4.1,
this is true iff both of the following conditions hold:
(i) |Y | ≥ |X|;
(ii) For each k ∈ {1, . . . , |Y |}, the inverse-level of the k chores in Y that are
best by rev (i.e., worst by ), is at least as high as the inverse-level of
the k chores in X that are worst by .
The first condition is equivalent to |X| ≤ |Y | and the second condition is equiv-
alent to Lev(Xk) ≥ Lev(Y k).
9.2. Increasing differences — fairness concepts
Analogously to Definition 3.5, we have:
Definition 9.7. Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n, an allocation X is called:
• Necessary-ID-proportional (NIDPR) if it is proportional for all utility pro-
files u1, . . . , un in UID(1, . . . ,n).
• Possible-ID-proportional (PIDPR) if it is proportional for at least one
utility profile u1, . . . , un in UID(1, . . . ,n).
Analogously to Lemma 3.6, and with a similar proof that we omit, we have:
Lemma 9.8. Given item rankings 1, . . . ,n:
• An allocation X is NIDPR iff ∀i ∈ N : n ·Xi %NIDi M.
• An allocation X is PIDPR iff ∀i ∈ N : n ·Xi %PIDi M.
Based on the lemmas proved in subsection 9.1, we have the following ana-
logue of Corollary 4.7:
Corollary 9.9. It can be decided in polynomial time whether a given allocation
is NIDPR or PIDPR.
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In Section 5 we proved that an NDD-proportional allocation exists whenever
the number of items is an integer multiple of the number of agents, and all agents
have different best items. At first glance, the natural extension of this condition
to chores is that all agents should have different worst chores. The following
two examples show that this condition is neither sufficient nor necessary.
Example 9.10. There are eight chores and four agents with rankings:
A : a  b  c  d  w  x  y  z
B : b  c  d  a  w  x  z  y
C : c  d  a  b  w  z  y  x
D : d  a  b  c  x  z  y  w
Each agent has a different best chore and each agent has a different worst chore.
However, at least one agent (the one who receives y) has a second-worst chore.
This implies that an NIDPR allocation does not exist. To see this, suppose that
all agents have the same ID scoring function:
−996,−997,−998,−999,−1000,−2000,−3000,−4000
The utility of the agent who receives y is at most −3996. However, the total
value is −13990 and the fair share is −13990/4 = −3497.5.
Example 9.11. There are three chores and three agents with rankings:
A : x  y  z
B : x  z  y
C : x  z  y
All agents have the same best chore, and two agents have the same worst chore.
However, the following allocation is NIDPR:
A : {y} B : {x} C : {z}
This is obvious for Bob since he receives his best (easiest) chore. To see that it is
also true for Alice, we show that 3 ·XA %NIDA M using Theorem 9.6. Condition
(i) clearly holds since both multi-bundles have 3 chores. For Condition (ii),
compare the levels of the k worst chores, for k = 1, 2, 3:
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
3 ·XA 2 2 2
M 1 2 3
Difference +1 0 −1
Accumulated difference +1 +1 0
The accumulated difference is always at least 0, so 3·XA %NIDA M. By a similar
calculation, 3 ·XC %NIDC M. Hence the allocation is NIDPR.
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Below we present a different condition that is necessary for the existence
of NIDPR allocations. It is analogous to the “only-if” part of Theorem 5.1.
To define this condition, for each agent i, let Wi be the set of i’s dn−12 e worst
chores.
Theorem 9.12. If there exists a NIDPR allocation of chores among n agents,
then both the following conditions must hold:
(a) The number of chores is M = m · n, for some integer m.
(b) It is possible to allocate to each agent i, m chores that are not from Wi.
(Hence, the intersection of all dn−12 e-worst-chores sets is empty: ∩i∈NWi = ∅).
Proof. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be an NIDPR allocation. Then for every agent i,
n ·Xi %NIDi M. By Theorem 9.6.
(a) For every i ∈ N : |n ·Xi| ≤ |M| =⇒ n · |Xi| ≤M. But this must be an
equality since the total number of items in all n bundles is exactly M . So the
total number of items is n · |Xi| which is an integer multiple of n.
(b) For every i ∈ N , the level of the n worst chores in n ·Xi must be weakly
larger than the level of the n worst chores inM. The n worst chores inM have
levels 1, . . . , n, so their total level is n(n+1)2 . The n worst chores in n · Xi are
just n copies of the worst chore in Xi. Thus, the level of this chore must be at
least n(n+1)2 /n =
n+1
2 . Since levels are integers, the smallest level in Xi must
be at least dn+12 e. So the agent must not get any of his dn−12 e worst chores. In
other words, agent i must not get any chore from the set Wi. Since all chores
must be allocated, no chore may be in the intersection of all Wi.
In Example 9.10, dn−12 e = 2, and the intersection of the 2-worst-chores sets
is not empty (it contains chore y), so an NIDPR allocation does not exist. In
Example 9.11, dn−12 e = 1, the intersection of the worst-chore sets is empty (since
not all three agents have the same worst chore), and an NIDPR allocation exists.
We do not know if the condition of Theorem 9.12 is also sufficient for the
existence of NIDPR allocations in general. Below we prove that they are suffi-
cient in two special cases: two agents, and three agents with “almost” identical
rankings.
9.3. NIDPR allocation for two agents
With two agents, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the set Wi contains just the worst chore
of agent i, so the necessary condition of Theorem 9.12 simply says that each
agent has a different worst chore. We show that this condition is also sufficient
for the existence of NIDPR allocations. The following is a partial analogue to
the “if” part of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 9.13. There exists a NIDPR allocation of chores among n = 2 agents
whenever the following conditions both hold:
(a) The number of chores is M = m · n, for some integer m.
(b) The worst chores of the agents are different.
In case it exists, it can be found in time O(M).
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Proof. We prove that the balanced-round-robin algorithm (Algorithm 2), used
in the proof of Theorem 5.1, produces an NIDPR allocation in our case. Let Xi
be the bundle allocated to agent i by this algorithm. We prove that n ·Xi %NIDi
M by the two conditions of Theorem 9.6.
Condition (i) is satisfied with equality, since by (a) each agent gets exactly
m items, so |n ·Xi| = nm = M = |M|.
Condition (ii) says that, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the total level of the k
worst chores in the multi-bundle n ·Xi is at least as large as the total level of
the k worst chores in M. In other words, the level-difference Levi((n ·Xi)k)−
Levi(M) must be at least 0 for every k. Note that each agent receives chores
from best to worst. We are interested in levels of chores from worst to best, so
we analyze the algorithm from the last round towards the first. We check that
the total level-difference (the variable TotalLevelDiff in Algorithm 1) is always
at least 0.
The worst chore in Xi is the chore given to agent i in the last round. In the
last round, only two chores remain to be allocated. By condition (b) the worst
chores of the agents are different, hence the best remaining chores of the agents
are also different. Hence, in the last round each agent receives a chore with a
level of at least 2, so the level of the worst 2 chores in n ·Xi is at least 2. The
following table shows the levels and their differences for k ∈ {1, 2}:
k = 1 k = 2
n ·Xi ≥ 2 ≥ 2
M 1 2
LevelDiff ≥ 1 ≥ 0
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 1 ≥ 1
Clearly the level difference is weakly-positive and there is a total accumulated
difference of at least 1.
We now prove that, for each round r ≥ 1 (counting from the last one), the
accumulated level-difference for k ∈ {2r− 1, 2r} is at least 1 when r is odd, and
at least 4 − 2i when r is even. In particular, it is always at least 0. The proof
is by induction on r. We have just proved the base r = 1.
Suppose now that r is even and r > 1. When agent i gets a chore, the
number of remaining chores is rn+ 1− i, so agent i’s best remaining chore has
a level of at least rn + 1 − i = 2r + 1 − i. Therefore, the level-differences for
k ∈ {2r− 1, 2r} are as in the following table (the last row takes into account an
accumulated difference of at least +1 from the induction assumption):
n ·Xi ≥ 2r + 1− i ≥ 2r + 1− i
M 2r − 1 2r
LevelDiff ≥ 2− i ≥ 1− i
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 3− i ≥ 4− 2i
So for both i, the accumulated differences are positive and their total is at least
4− 2i, as claimed.
Suppose now that r is odd and r > 1. When agent i gets a chore, the number
of remaining chores is rn + i− 2. Therefore, agent i’s best remaining item has
26
a level of at least rn + i − 2 = 2r + i − 2. Therefore, the level-differences for
k ∈ {2r − 1, r} are as in the following table(the last row takes into account an
accumulated difference of at least 4− 2i from the induction assumption):
n ·Xi ≥ 2r + i− 2 ≥ 2r + i− 2
M 2r − 1 2r
LevelDiff ≥ i− 1 ≥ i− 2
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 3− i ≥ 1
So for both i, the accumulated differences are positive and their total is at least
1, as claimed.
9.4. NIDPR allocations for three agents
Theorem 9.13 does not generalize to three or more agents. The balanced-
round-robin protocol does not necessarily find a NIDPR allocation, even if it
exists. In Example 9.11, the rankings satisfy the necessary condition of Theorem
9.12, and an NIDPR allocation exists, but the round-robin protocol (in the order
A B C) yields the allocation:
A : {x} B : {z} C : {y}
which is not NIDPR since it gives Carl his worst chore.
For three agents, we consider the following special case:
• All agents have the same n worst chores;
• All agents have the same M − n best chores, and rank them identically.
In some sense this is a “worst case” of fair allocations, since the agents’ prefer-
ences are as similar as they can be without violating the necessary condition.
We prove that, in this “worst case”, the necessary condition of Theorem 9.12
is also sufficient.
Theorem 9.14. There exists a NIDPR allocation of chores among n = 3 agents
whenever the following conditions hold:
(a) The number of chores is M = m · n, for some integer m.
(b) Not all agents have the same worst chore;
(c) All agents have the same n worst chores;
(d) All agents have the same M −n worst chores and rank them identically.
In this case, it can be found in time O(M).
Proof. We first allocate the n worst chores. By condition (b), it is possible to
give each agent a chore with a level of at least 2. Moreover, by simple case
analysis it is possible to see that it is always possible to give at least one agent a
chore with a level of at least 3. Hence, after this step, the total level-differences
of all agents are at least 0:
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k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
n ·Xi 2 2 2
M 1 2 3
LevelDiff 1 0 −1
TotalLevelDiff 1 1 0
and the total level-difference of at least one agent is 3:
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
n ·Xi 3 3 3
M 1 2 3
LevelDiff 2 1 0
TotalLevelDiff 2 3 3
We now have M−n remaining chores. By condition (d), the levels of these chores
are the same for all agents, namely, 4, . . . ,M . We allocate them from worst (4)
to best (M), using a round-robin protocol. There are m− 1 allocation rounds;
in each round, the first (worst) chore is given to an agent whose TotalLevelDiff
is at least 3. We prove by induction that, indeed, when each round ends, there
is at least one agent with TotalLevelDiff at least 3, while all other agents have
TotalLevelDiff at least 0.
The induction base (r = 1) was already proved above. Assume the claim is
true until the beginning of some round r. The level of the next chore to allocate
is 3r − 2. It is given to an agent with TotalLevelDiff at least 3, so his levels
change as follows:
k = 3r − 2 k = 3r − 1 k = 3r
n ·Xi 3r − 2 3r − 2 3r − 2
M 3r − 2 3r − 1 3r
LevelDiff 0 −1 −2
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 3 ≥ 2 ≥ 0
The next chore is 3r − 1. It is given to an agent with TotalLevelDiff at least 0,
so his levels change as follows:
k = 3r − 2 k = 3r − 1 k = 3r
n ·Xi 3r − 1 3r − 1 3r − 1
M 3r − 2 3r − 1 3r
LevelDiff 1 0 −1
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 1 ≥ 1 ≥ 0
The next chore is 3r1. It is given to an agent with TotalLevelDiff at least 0, so
his levels change as follows:
k = 3r − 2 k = 3r − 1 k = 3r
n ·Xi 3r 3r 3r
M 3r − 2 3r − 1 3r
LevelDiff 2 1 0
TotalLevelDiff ≥ 2 ≥ 3 ≥ 3
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As claimed, after round r ends, all agents have TotalLevelDiff at least 0, and
one agent has TotalLevelDiff at least 3.
Hence, the resulting allocation is NIDPR.
Theorem 9.14 can be extended to more than 3 agents. Whenever the worst
n chores can be allocated such that the total level-difference of all agents is
at least 0 and the total level-difference of some agents is sufficiently high, it is
possible to allocated the other chores such that the total level-difference of all
agents remains at least 0. Moreover, instead of requiring that all agents have
exactly the same ranking to their M − n best chores, it is sufficient that all
agents have the same worst n chores (levels 1, . . . , n), the same next-worst n
chores (levels n + 1, . . . , 2n), etc. We omit these results since we believe that
the main interesting challenge is generalizing the theorem to arbitrary rankings.
Finding a general sufficient condition and protocol for NIDPR allocation of
chores remains an interesting open question.
10. Binary Utilities
In this section, we compare the diminishing/increasing differences assump-
tions to another natural assumption, which we call Binary. It is based on the
assumption that each agent only cares about getting as many as possible of his k
best items, where k is an integer that may be different for different agents. The
binary assumption was also studied by Bouveret and Lang [14, Proposition 21],
who proved that finding an efficient envy-free allocations with such preferences
is NP-complete.
The following definition is analogous to Definitions 3.1 and 9.1:
Definition 10.1. Let  be a preference relation and u a utility function con-
sistent with . We say that u is Binary if, for some integer k ≥ 1:
u(x) =
{
1 when Lev(x) ≥ k
0 when Lev(x) < k
We denote by UBIN () the set of all binary utility functions consistent with .
The following definition is analogous to Definitions 3.3 and 9.4:
Definition 10.2. For (multi-)bundles Xi, Yi:
Xi %NBINi Yi ⇐⇒ ∀ui ∈ UBIN (i): ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Yi)
Xi %PBINi Yi ⇐⇒ ∃ui ∈ UBIN (i): ui(Xi) ≥ ui(Yi)
For every fairness concept, NBIN-fairness and PBIN-fairness can be defined
based on the %NBIN and %PBIN relations, analogously to Definitions 3.5 and
7.1 and 9.7.
The Binary assumption appears much more restrictive than the DD assump-
tion. For every , the set UBIN () contains only M utility functions — much
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less than UDD(). Therefore, one could expect NBIN-fairness to be easier to
satisfy than NDD-fairness. But this is not the case: NBIN-fairness is equivalent
to necessary fairness and PBIN-fairness is equivalent to possible fairness. This
follows from the following theorem.
Theorem 10.3. For every item-ranking  and every multi-bundles X,Y :
(a) X Nec Y if-and-only-if X NBIN Y and
(b) X Pos Y if-and-only-if X PBIN Y .
Proof. It is sufficient to prove the following directions:
(a) If X NBIN Y then X Nec Y ;
(b) If not X PBIN Y then not X Pos Y .
For the proof, we use the following notation.
• The M items are denoted by their level, so the best item is M and the
worst is 1.
• For a multi-bundle X and an item j, the number of copies of j in X is
denoted X[j].
• The M utility functions in UBIN () are denoted by Uk, for k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
In this notation, for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and multi-bundle X:
Uk(X) =
M∑
j=k
X[j] (1)
so UM (X) = X[M ] (the agent cares only about the best item), UM−1(X) =
X[M ] + X[M − 1] (the agent cares only about the two best items), etc.
Moreover, for every function u in U() and multi-bundle X:
u(X) =
M∑
j=1
u(j) ·X[j] (2)
Substituting the X[j] in (2) using (1) gives:
u(X) = u(M) · UM (X) +
M∑
j=2
u(j − 1) ·
(
Uj−1(X)− Uj(X)
)
=
M∑
j=2
(
u(j)− u(j − 1)
)
· Uj(X) + u(1) · U1(X)
so every additive function u is a linear combination of the functions Uk. Note
that all coefficients in this linear combination are non-negative. Hence:
• If ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}: Uk(X) ≥ Uk(Y ), then ∀u ∈ U() : u(X) ≥ u(Y ).
This implies (a).
• If ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}: Uk(X) < Uk(Y ), then ∀u ∈ U() : u(X) < u(Y ).
This implies (b).
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11. Conclusions and Future Work
We formalized natural ways to compare sets by using the DD (diminishing
differences) assumption for goods and ID (increasing differences) assumption
for chores. The relations lead to new fairness concepts which we studied in
detail. Two main open questions remain for future work: one about envy-free
allocation (Section 7), and one about allocation of chores (Section 9). Besides
these questions, it may be interesting to extend the results to the case where
agents may express weak preferences between items.
Additionally, it can be interesting to identify other interesting set extensions
that correspond to classes of utility functions. For example, suppose that agents
care both about getting a best item and about not getting a worst item, but
do not care much about intermediate items (so the differences in utilities are
decreasing at first and then increasing). What can be said of fair allocations
under this assumption?
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A. Proof of technical lemmas
Lemma 3.2. Given a ranking  and a utility function u, the following are
equivalent:
(i) u ∈ UDD();
(ii) For every four items x4, x3, x2, x1 with x4  x2 and x3  x1 and x4 6= x3
and x2 6= x1:
u(x4)− u(x3)
Lev(x4)− Lev(x3) ≥
u(x2)− u(x1)
Lev(x2)− Lev(x1)
Proof. (i) =⇒ (ii): Let k := Lev(x4) − Lev(x3). Then there are k + 1
items whose level is between x4 and x3 (inclusive). Denote these items by yj for
j ∈ {0, . . . , k}, such that x4 = yk  yk−1  . . .  y0 = x3. Then, the left-hand
size of (ii) can be written as:∑k
j=1 u(yj)− u(yj−1)
k
31
This is an arithmetic mean of the k differences u(yj)−u(yj−1), for j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Similarly, the right-hand size of (ii) is an arithmetic mean of k′ utility-
differences of items whose level is between x2 and x1.
By assumption, x4  x2 and x3  x1. By the DD property (i), to each
difference in the left-hand side corresponds a weakly-smaller difference in the
right-hand size. Therefore, the arithmetic mean in the left-hand side is weakly
larger.
(ii) =⇒ (i): in (ii), let x3 be the element ranked immediately below x4,
let x2 = x3, and let x1 be the element ranked immediately below x2. Then the
denominators both equal 1, and u satisfies the DD definition.
Theorem 7.4. When there are n ≥ 3 agents and at least 2n items, checking
the existence of NDDEF allocations is NP-hard (as a function of n).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Bouveret et al. [13] for the NP-
hardness of checking existence of NecEF allocations. We now present their
reduction and show that it works for NDDEF as well.
The proof is by reduction from the exact-3-cover problem, whose inputs are:
• A base set of 3q elements;
• A set-family containing n ≥ q triplets, C1, . . . , Cn, each of which contains
exactly 3 elements from the base-set.
The question is whether there exist q pairwise-disjoint triplets whose union is the
base-set. Given an instance of exact-3-cover, an instance of fair item allocation
is constructed as follows:
• To the 3q base elements correspond 3q main items, denoted by Main. To
each triplet Ci corresponds a set of three main items, denoted by Maini,
such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : Maini ⊆ Main. The sets Maini, like the
triplets Ci, are not necessarily disjoint. We denote by Main−i the main
items not in Maini.
• There are also 3n dummy items denoted by Dummy. To each triplet
Ci corresponds a set of three dummy items, denoted by Dummyi :=
{di, di′ , di′′}. All such sets are pairwise disjoint. We denote by Dummy−i
the dummy items not in Dummyi.
• There are 3(n− q) auxiliary items, denoted by Aux. They are partitioned
to n − q pairwise-disjoint triplets, denoted by Auxj := {xj , xj′ , xj′′}, for
j ∈ {q + 1, . . . , n}. All in all, there are 6n items.
• To each triplet Ci corresponds a set of three agents, Agentsi = {i, i′, i′′}.
The sets Agentsi are pairwise disjoint. All in all, there are 3n agents.
• The preferences of the three agents in Agentsi are, in general:
Dummyi Maini  Auxq+1  · · ·  Auxn  Dummy−i Main−i
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Their preferences over the three items in Dummyi are “cyclic”, i.e, for
agent i it is di  di′  di′′ , for agent i′ it is di′  di′′  di, and for agent
i′′ it is di′′  di  di′ . Their preferences over the three items in Maini are
cyclic in a similar way. Their preferences over the three items in Auxj ,
for each j ∈ {q + 1, . . . , n}, are cyclic in a similar way. Their preferences
over Dummy−i and Main−i are arbitrary.
Bouveret et al. [13] prove that there exists a NecEF allocation iff there exists
an exact-3-cover. The proof involves three arguments:
(i) In a NecEF allocation, each agent must receive the same number of items.
Here there are 6n items and 3n agents so each agent must get exactly two
items. One of these items must be its top dummy item, which is easy to
do since the top dummy items of all agents are different. So, it remains to
prove that there is an exact-3-cover, if-and-only-if the second items can
be allocated in a NecEF way, i.e., such that each agent prefers the worst
item in his bundle to the worst item in any other bundle.
(ii) Cover =⇒ allocation: Suppose there is an exact-3-cover, e.g, with
the triplets C1, . . . , Cq. Then, the sets of main items Main1, . . . ,Mainq
are pairwise-disjoint and their union is exactly Main. Then, for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, it is possible to allocate the three items in Mainj to
the three agents in Agentsj , giving each agent his favorite main item.
Let’s call these 3q agents in the triplets Agents1, . . . , Agentsq, the “lucky
agents”. The allocation is NecEF for the lucky agents since their worst
item is their 4th-best item while the worst item in any other bundle is at
most their 5th-best item (since their three best items are the dummy items
and they are already allocated). It remains to determine an allocation
for the 3(n − q) “unlucky” agents, Agentsq+1, · · · , Agentsn. For each
j ∈ {q + 1, . . . , n}, give to the three agents in Agentsj , the three items
in Auxj , giving each agent his favorite item from that triplet. This item
is better for them than the worst items in the other bundles, which are
from Main−i or Dummy−i, so the allocation is NecEF for them too.
(iii) Allocation =⇒ cover: Suppose there is a NecEF allocation. For each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, consider the three agents in Agentsi. We claim that either
all of them receive a main item from Maini, or none of them does. Proof:
suppose e.g. that agent i receives item mi ∈Maini but agent i′ does not
receive any item from Maini. Then, the allocation of i is {di,mi} and
the best possible allocation for i′ is {di′ , xi′}, where xi′ is the auxiliary
item preferred by agent i′. But for agent i′, both items allocated to agent
i are better than xi′ . Therefore agent i
′ might envy i, so the division is
not NecEF. Since each main item must be allocated to exactly one agent,
there exists an exact-3-cover: the triplet Ci is in the cover if-and-only-if
the agents in Agentsi receive the items in Maini.
We now show that the reduction also works for NDDEF. Claim (i) works for
NDDEF by Theorem 4.1. Claim (ii) clearly works for NDDEF since every NEF
33
allocation is NDDEF. It remains to prove claim (iii). Suppose there exists an
NDDEF allocation. This allocation is, in particular, envy-free according to the
Borda score. We claim that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, either all three agents in
Agentsi receive an item from Maini, or none of them does. Proof: consider the
following two cases:
• One agent, say i, receives his main item mi, but the other agents i′, i′′ do
not receive their main items. The dummy items give agent i′′ a Borda-
advantage of 1 over i. The best second item that can be allocated to i′′ is
his best auxiliary item, but this leaves him with a Borda-disadvantage of
2 relative to i, so i′′ Borda-envies i.
• Two agents, say i′, i′′, receive their main items mi′ ,mi′′ , but agent i does
not receive his main item. The dummy items give agent i a Borda-
advantage of 1 over i′. The best second item that can be allocated to
i is his best auxiliary item, but this leaves him with a Borda-disadvantage
of 2 relative to i′, so i Borda-envies i′.
Therefore the reduction is valid for NDDEF too, and the theorem is proved.
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